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DOUBTING DONALD: A REPLY TO
PROFESSOR DONALD GALLOWAY'S
"CRITICAL MISTAKES"**
by
Richard F. Devlin*
In a recent article Professor Galloway has argued that supporters
of the Critical Legal Studies perspective make five fundamental
errors in their analyses of liberal theory and as a result have
failed in their deconstructive agenda. In this essay Professor Devlin
replies to these criticisms and posits that Galloway's essay in
retrieval is itself subject to the very same errors of which he
accuses the "crits". Moreover, it is argued that the nature of
Gal/,oway 's partial defence of liberalism confirms rather than
denies the accuracy of critical assessments.

Donald l'incredule: Reponse aux "Critical Mistakes"
(Erreurs critiques) du professeur Donald Galloway
Un article recent du professeur GaUoway pretend que Les partisans
des Critical Legal Studies (Etudes juridi,ques criti,ques) commettent
cinq erreurs fondamentales dans leurs analyses de la theorie
liberate, et que par consequent ils echouent dans leur tentative
de deconstruction. le� le professeur Devlin repond a ces criti,ques
en affirmant que l'essai d 'iteration de Galloway commet Les memes
erreurs dont ii accuse Les "criticistes. " En plus, le present auteur
trouve que la defense partielle du liberalisme offerte par Galloway,
win de nier !'exactitude des evaluations criticistes, tend plutot
a Les confirmer.
"An observation of human behaviour is that people respond, often
dramatically, when the ideas that give meaning to their lives are
threatened. Critical Legal Studies challenges many of the things that
constitute the psychological and professional identity of legal academics,
so their response is understandable. While CLS has been scorned and
derided, at least within the legal academy it has had a profoundly
disquieting impact in undermining the accepted modes of legal dis
course. One response has been simply to attempt to remove the critics.
For more thoughtful and committed scholars, a di.fferenr response has
been to build an intellectual defense."'

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Calgary.
** Versions of this paper were presented at the Western Canadian Legal Theory

Symposium, University of Alberta, March 1991; The Theorea Workshop
at the University of Windsor, April, 1991; and Carleton Legal Theory
Workshop, May 1991. I would particularly like to thank Sandy Dobrowolsky,
Allan Hutchinson and Alan Hunt for their comments on a draft. The essay
is dedicated to the memory of Mary Joe Frug.

1

J.M. Feinman, "Practical Legal Studies and Critical Legal Studies" (1988),
87 Mich. LR 724, 730.
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It seems to me that one of the most interesting developments
in the legal scholarship of the rich Euro-American societies has
been the emergence of what has become known as Critical Legal
Studies. Somewhat less interesting, but politically crucial, has been
the response triggered in the legal academy. At first, the liberal
legal academy was open to critical analyses while they were sti11
in embryonic form and scarce enough to be politically unthreatening.
However, as the movement has garnered strength (and followers)
the limits of liberal tolerance have rapidly been reached. It is in
the United States that the reaction has been most vehement with
widely publicized invectives from pillars of the American legal
academy calling for the expulsion of the Crits from the citadel.2
In Britain, the response has been more subtle suggesting that there
is nothing particularly innovative about the Crits, that they may
be merely "iconoclastic social democrats",3 "perhaps no more than
a passing fashion'1. 4
Characteristically, the Canadian response has been more muted.5
In this brief essay I want to respond to what I consider to be an
important Canadian challenge to critical legal studies, Professor
Donald Galloway's "Critical Mistakes".6 In so doing I will suggest
2 P. Carrington, "Of Law and the River" (1984), 34 J. of Leg. Ed. 222; R.
Posner, "The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship" (I 981), 90 Yale LJ.
11I 3, 1128. For a useful overview of reactions to the crits in the United
States coupled with some thoughtful replies see J. Frug, "McCarthyism and
Critical Legal Studies" (1987), 22 Harv. C.RC.LLR 665.
3 N. MacCormick, "Reconstruction After Deconstruction: A Response to CLS"
(1990), 10 Ox. J. Leg. St. 539.
4 J.M. Finnis, "On Legal Studies Movement" in J. Eekelaar, J. Bell (eds.) Oxford
Essays in Jurisprudence (Third Series) (1987) 145. The politeness of the British
response should not however be understood as totally benign for MacCormick
accuses various crits of being "contemptuous" and "impertinent" (supra note
3, 555 & 556), and Finnis posits that Unger is "careless" ( id., 150) and
guilty of "alarmist conjuring" (id, 163). Perhaps the most vitriolic response
is Tony Weir's review of Hugh Collins, The Law of Contract (1986), in
which he variously accuses Collins of inter alia, "perversity", "obscurity",
"omission", "misrepresentation" and "inaccuracy" (1986), 45 C.LJ. 501. As
will become obvious, similar accusations underpin Galloway's essay.
5 For some responses to the Crits in Canada see L. Green "The Political Content
of Legal Theory" ( 1987), 17 Phil Soc. Sci. I; D. Dyzenhaus, "The New
Positivists" (1989), 39 U. T.LJ. 361; B. Langille, "Revolution without Foun
dation: The Grammar of Scepticism and Law" (1988), 34 McGill LJ. 451;
J. Underwood Lewis, "Jurisprudence" (1988), 20 Ottawa LR 671, 681; J.E.
Bickenbach, Review: The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology (1989), 39 U. T.LJ.
211, 213.
6 In R.F. Devlin, Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (1991) 255, hereinafter
Perspectives. All page references to Galloway's essay in text will be given
in parentheses. A note of explanation is perhaps appropriate here. I asked
Professor Galloway to participate in this book, which is an attempt to develop
a set of Canadian teaching materials, as I believe he is an important interlocutor
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that, first, he is guilty of some of the very things of which he accuses
the crits; second, that his cautious defence of liberalism betrays
a startlingly anaemic vision of the liberal theoretical agenda; and
third, that his strategies of resistance incorporate both of the re
actions outlined by Feinman in the opening quotation. To be fair
to Galloway, though, he is no "fundamentalist liberal" 7 for he
recognizes some of the limitations of liberalism and acknowledges
that the crits may have done some good. However, as I read
him, these laurels are begrudgingly given and relate more to the
vivacious style and emotionalism of the crits, and not to their
substance.
But I rush ahead of myself. Before I substantiate these propositions
through a cautious reading of Galloway's arguments, it will be
helpful if I trace (if only briefly) the outline of his thesis. Galloway
commences his article with a confession that the "non radical
mainstreaqi literature" [255] on law is somewhat flawed, but argues
that it is much less problematic than the crits suggest. Indeed, he
states that his aim is to "reassert ... the strengths of mainstream
theory" [256], to "expose ...the weaknesses in the Crit strategies"
[256], and that his method will be to demonstrate that crits have
failed to "meet stringent internal requirements" [256].In short, his
is a self confessed essay in redemption.
The essence of his concern and the nature of his redemptive
technique are captured in the following quotation:
"Canadian Crits have used a number of strategies . . . to dissuade
people from exploring in depth or taking seriously the writings of
non-radical theorists. I proceed by examining five of these strategies
with a view to arguing that, while they may have been successful
in so persuading people, they ought not to have been" [256, f ootnote
omitted].

in the Canadian jurisprudential debate. As with all contributors, I gave him
fairly wide scope to address whatever he felt was his current interest and
perspective. I did request him to contribute to the Chapter on Liberalism,
but he indicated that his preference would be to do a critique of the crits
and I thought, and still think, it was a great idea as it reinf orces the dialogic
aspirations of the book. The only two limitations I set were that it be
approximately twenty-five pages, and be as "Canadian" as possible. Ob
viously, in a text of the nature of Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory
it would have been an abuse of my editorial role to comment on Galloway's
essay. Therefore, what follows is an attempt to continue the critical con
versation in the spirit of openness and genuine disagreement. I should also
point out that this is Galloway's second challenge to the crits, the first being
his review of Allan Hutchinson's Dwelling on the Threshold (1988), perhaps
somewhat harshly entitled, "No Guru, No Method" (1988), 8 Windsor Yearb.
Access Justice 304.
7 I borrow this phrase from Asbjorn Eide, "Strategies to Enforce the Right
to Food", Presentation at "Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century: A
Global Challenge", Banff, Alberta, November 9-12, 1990.
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The remainder of the essay is a purported identification, doc
umentation and deflation of these five posited critical strategies
interspersed with some modest revisions of mainstream theory.
More specifically, Galloway claims that the crits are guilty of:
a) the false representation of non-critical positions; b) an absence
of consideration of the nature of the enterprise upon which
mainstream theorists are embarked; c) a reductionist reading of
the rich and diverse liberal tradition; d) a failure to pay sufficient
attention to, and discriminate between, the various positions within
liberal theory; and e) the presentation of mainstream theory as
an instrument of legitimation. In support of these indictments,
Galloway draws heavily on the work of Joseph Raz and Ronald
Dworkin.
If Professor Galloway was correct in these accusations, if he
was accurate in his claim that the crits unfairly mislead people
as to the virtues of liberal legal theory, then I do believe that
this essay woulq be a serious challenge to the integrity of the
critical agenda. However, I think that his critique is, in part,
inaccurate and misplaced, and that his revision of the liberal project
ultimately causes more, rather than less, problems for the liberal
theoretical agenda. My purpose in this essay is to analyze and
rebut each of Galloway's criticisms in turn and, in the process,
to provide some further elaboration of certain critical positions
as well as to conjecture as to the current status of the critical
legal studies movement.

a) False Representation
Galloway's primary complaint is that Crits represent "noncritical
positions falsely" [257]. This he variously describes as "patent
inaccuracy" [257], a most "pernicious gambit" [257] and a
"misinformation" [258] campaign. Just in case there is any doubt
as to the seriousness of Galloway's concern, he emphasizes "that
he is not referring to unusual interpretations of a text or argument"
[257].
Galloway's first, and therefore I assume star, example of
allegedly false representation relates to two sentences which he
selects from one of my recently published articles. He quotes:
Coercion has been much ignored in recent jurisprudential debate.
Not surprisingly liberals, emphasizing rights, have tended to ignore
this issue because it raises the spectre of a legitimation crisis.8

Several points are worth noting about these sentences. The first
is that Galloway provides little by way of their context. The sentences
are to be found in an article that has less to do with critiquing
"liberal theory" than providing a neo-marxist interpretation and
examples of the nature and practice of law, premised upon an
existentialist/situationalist rather than mainstream methodology.
8

"Law's Centaurs: An Inquiry into the Nature and Relations of Law, State
and Violence" (1989), 27 Osgoode Hall LJ. 219, 235.
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Secondly, the sentences that follow those quoted by Galloway then
proceed to criticize the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, the
North American Critical Legal Studies Movement and neo-Marxist
theorists of the state for also underestimating the potency of state
violence. Consequently, the first sentence of the quotation refers
to both mainstream and critical theory.Can one sentence in a seventy
four page essay that does not specifically address liberal legal theory
really do as much as Galloway fears?
Moreover, and third, if we are to be in the business of textual
nitpicking, I do not say that liberals have "ignored" the issue of
coercion, rather it is that they have "tended to ignore" it. My point
was to suggest that it plays a less than crucial role in much of
modern liberal analysis.But Galloway would reject even this restated
version of my position.For example, he points to Dworkin's Law's
Empire arguing that it is "built around the premise that the point
of law is to guide and constrain the power of government" [258]
and then proceeds to quote one sentence from Dworkin which states
that, in essence, the use of force by the state is legitimate if it
fits with previous political decisions as to when it can be legitimately
used. This, then, is meant to be a refutation of my proposition as
to the decentralization of coercion from the liberal discursive agenda.
Galloway sells Dworkin short here for, indeed, in Law's Empire
there is a specific section entitled, "Grounds and Force of Law"
that runs for a whole five pages! A careful reading of �his section
and a sensitivity to its location in Dworkin's 470 page tome confirms
rather than denies my passing comment. For Dworkin, the neces
sarily coercive nature of law is a taken for granted assumption
that does not merit jurisprudential interrogation.Dworkin posits:
for us, legal argument takes place on a rough plateau of consensus
that if law exists it provides a justification for the collective use
of power against individual citizens or groups.9

Or as he says a little later, legal philosophers "share a general
unspecified opinion about the force of law .. . the law should be
obeyed and enforced." 10 Viewed in the light of these assumptions,
we should be grateful to Dworkin for even spending five pages
buried one quarter of the way through his book to address this
non-issue upon which there is jurisprudential consensus.
There are at least two problems with Dworkin's propositions.
First, instrumentalist marxists11 and radically empathetic liberals, 12
for example, have worried at length about the coercive dimensions
of law, and so Dworkin's consensual claim is quite simply inaccurate
Law's Empire (1986), 108 [hereinafter Empire].
ld,1l1.
See, for example, certain aspects of Marx's and Engels' analysis of the use
of penal laws against Catholics in Ireland in Ireland and the Irish Question
(1971), and Lenin's, The State and Revolution (l 976) .
12 See, for example, Robert Cover, "Violence and the Word" (1986), 95 Yale
LJ. 1601.

9

10
11
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unless, of course, he conceives of the legal philosophical community
as populated exclusively by relatively like minded (Oxford based)
jurisprudents. This, however, leads to my second concern. Just
because a bunch of privileged academics agree that the force of
law is not important in any jurisprudentially interesting way does
not mean that it is not an important question existentially for those
who are the victims of legal violence. Indeed the purpose of my
essay, drawing as it does from a view from the bottom, 1 3 was to
introduce a note of discordance into the otherwise harmonious
chorus of jurisprudential choirboys. Consensus, if based upon
exclusion, can be repressive rather than accurate.
But even Dworkin seems uncomfortable with the position of what
might be called "assumed foundational irrelevancy" and so, a few
pages later, he supplements his cavalier confession with contrived
avoidance. He claims that:
Academic tradition enforces a certain division of labour in thinking
about law. Poljtical philosophers consider problems about the force
of law, and academic lawyers and specialists in jurisprudence study
issues about its grounds. Philosophies of law are in consequence
usually unbalanced theories of law: they are mainly about the grounds
and almost silent about the force of law. They abstract from the
problem of force, that is, in order to study the problem of grounds
more carefully. 1 4

I think two interconnected points are relevant here. Some feminists
have suggested that many scholars tend to point to structures as
justification for their own personal failures to deal with certain
issues. This is variously described as "reification", or the "denial
of agency". I 5 Viewed from this perspective, and temporarily as
suming that Dworkin is accurate, "academic tradition" does
not "enforce"; rather, legal philosophers have chosen not to deal
with the question of the interconnection between law and force.
Viewed in this light, Dworkin's "silen(ce) about the force of law"
may be reinterpreted as an attempt to wish the problem out of
existence.
Secondly, Dworkin's claim that there is a division of labour
between "political philosophers" and "academic lawyers" is mis
leading and unsustainable. Classical jurists as diverse as Plato,
Aquinas, Austin, Kelsen and one of Dworkin's own heroes, Kant,
have devoted significant aspects of their work to a discussion of

13

As the introduction to my essay made clear, my view from the bottom
is that of an Irish person who grew up in British occupied Northern Ireland.
A parallel but different jurisprudential narrative from the bottom is provided
by Mari Matsuda, "Critical Legal Studies, C.L.S. and Reparations" ( l 987),
22 Har. CLCRLR 323.
1 4 Empire, 1 1 1 .
1 5 See, for example, Jill McCalla Vickers, "Memoirs of an Ontological Exile",
in A. Miles and G. Finn (eds.), Feminism in Canada: From Pressure to Politics
( 1 982), 27.
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the "force" of law, as well as to its "grounds". 1 6 What this suggests
is that Dworkin does not want to deal with the issue of domination
through law. Rather, his preference is to simply take it for granted,
to use
. it .as a foundation upon which to construct his own legal
empire.
But my point about Dworkin, and Galloway's defence of him,
is larger. It is not just that Dworkin's discussion of the coercive
elements of law is cursory and superficial, an angle that enables
him to play out his fantasies of chain novels and Hercules atop
Olympus that go on for hundreds of pages. Rather, it is that in
his scheme of things, law as coercion is a jurisprudential problematic
addressed, if at all, only to be hurriedly disposed of, rather than
being understood as a pervasive, systemic and systematic practice
of human victimization which philosopher kings cannot even
imagine let alone understand. It is for this reason that I asserted,
and now reaffirm, that liberal jurists like Dworkin "have tended
to ignore" coercion, because we are in fact talking about two
different things. Let me develop this last point in more detail by
dealing with Galloway's second proposed supporting text for his
rebuttal of my comments. 1 7
As I had not read The Morality of Freedom when I wrote "Law's
Centaur" I was discomfited by Galloway's proposition that "it offers
a penetrating (sic) analysis and persuasive account of (coercion's)
proper role in a liberal state" [258]. Consequently, I have spent
several weeks studying both the text, and the hefty symposium
dedicated to Raz entitled, The Works of Joseph Raz. 1 8 At first blush,
it would appear that Galloway's position is fair comment and that
I am rightly chastised, and perhaps should even be contrite, for
the first three substantive chapters, almost 80 pages in all, are an
inquiry into the nature and justification of the authority to use
coercion. However, a less superficial analysis rapidly indicates that,
in fact, Raz is not really concerned with what I am pointing out
in my paper. Raz's primary concern, in perfect harmony with
mainstream jurisprudential analysis, is to provide a justification for
the authoritative invocation of coercion through state and law. Like
Dworkin, at this stage in Raz's argument, coercion is simply assumed
and the jurisprudential exercise becomes one of developing argu
ments to legitimize it. This leads to a fetishization of the concept
of authority and a marginalization of the reality of coercion. 1 9 My
For a brief discussion of some of their thoughts on law and force see R.F.
Devlin, "Nomos and Thanatos Part A: The Killing Fields; Modern Law
and Legal Theory" (1989), 12 Dal LJ. 298, 317.
1 7 Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1987) [hereinafter Morality].
1 s (1989), 62 So. Cal LR 731-1235.
19 This concern that violence and coercion are not really central concerns
for Raz, that they are nagging philosophical nuisances that need to be dealt
with, is reinforced by Raz's own proposition, after having discussed "Au
thority", that "The stage is set for the examination of our main topic"
[Morality, 107]. Guess what is not really all that important?
16
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paper, on the other hand, seeks to identify a prior question. As
its title and overall substance make clear, my primary concern is
descriptive and explanatorial rather than legitimizing in nature. It
is an attempt to highlight the lived reality and pervasiveness of
the violence of law and state in liberal democratic society. The
difference is fundamental in that although Raz and I may use the
same word, coercion, we are actually talking about two different
things. For Raz, coercion is an abstraction, a philosophical problem
that needs to be dealt with in order to justify his political morality
of freedom through liberty. As such his arguments are squarely
in the tradition of positivistic analytic ·philosophy and his agenda
is pitched at the level of how his justifications for coercion
are analytically superior to those of a host of other analytic philo
sophers.
The closest that Raz comes to . acknowledging the horror that
is law is when he admits that coercion is "evil"20 or when he suggests
that:
In a rough and ready way we can divide the ways in which a
government controls and influences people into three.
First, some accept its authority and obey its instructions because
they are binding on them. Second, the government can and does
manipulate the environment, physical, economic and social, in which
people live. It constructs roads, flattens hills, digs canals, builds
harbours, employs workers, contracts for services . In all these similar
ways a government can exercise power and control over people
without attempting thereby to exercise authority over them. Finally,
a government controls people by providing remedies for breaches
of laws and for the violation of people's rights. People who are not
subject to the authority of the law may then obey the rules for
prudential reasons, or because even though they have no duty to
obey, disobedience will do more harm than good.2 1

But even here w e must note the positioning and euphemistic way
in which Raz . discusses state violence. It is placed last, suggesting
its relative lack of importance. Moreover, it is characterized as
"remedies" for breaches of law and violations of rights. There is
a complete absence of context specificity here. There is zero
discussion of what types of laws we are talking about; what and
whose rights we are assuming; to whose benefit these laws (and
consequently these remedies) accrue; the nature of these remedies;
and who are the victims of these remedies. Fear of law is re-encoded
as obedience for "prudential reasons", and the existential reality
of violence is transformed into some rationalistic utilitarian calculus
that "disobedience will do more harm than good." Too true.
To be fair to Raz, he does in fact specifically devote ten pages
to a direct discussion of coercion and I suppose, if we were to
take Dworkin as our benchmark, we should be grateful that Raz
20
21

Morality, 377.
Morality, 1 03.
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devotes 2.33 percent of his 429 page book to the issue.22 However,
it is not coercion of itself that is Raz's concern, but rather its
relationship to autonomy, and more particularly, the philosophical
justificatory role autonomy plays in the anti-perfectionist scholarship
of Robert Nozick, which Raz is keen to prove fallacious. Once
again we encounter an exercise in avoidance.
Raz approaches the issue of coercion by posing the following
rhetorical question:
Is there anything about coercion or its political use to justify anti
perfectionism?
Coercion is an evaluative term . While it has a fixed descriptive core,
its meaning cannot be fully explained without noting its moral
significance. I will adopt the following definition of coercion.
P coerces Q into not doing act A only if
A ( 1 ) P communicates to Q that h e intends to bring about or
have brought about some consequence, C, if Q does A.
( 2) P makes this communication intending Q to believe that
he does so in order to get Q not to do A .
(3) That C will happen is, for Q, a reason of great weight for
not doing A.
(4) Q believes that it is likely that P will bring about C if Q
does A and that C would leave him worse off, having done
A, than if he did not do A and P did not bring about C.
(5) Q does not do A .
(6) Part of Q's reason for not doing A is to avoid (or to lessen)
the likelihood of C by making it less likely that P will bring
it about.
B P's actions which conform to the conditions set out in A are
prima facie wrong.
C The fact that Q acted under those circumstances is a reason
for not blaming him for not doing A.
Only a communication meeting conditions A 1 -4 is a coercive threat. 23

To me, this is such a formulaic and philosophically clinical
conception of coercion that it anaesthetizes us to the impact of
what coercion, particularly by the state, is like. It is decontextual
in that it gives no indication of the massive disparities in power
between the coercer and the coerced. It is hypothetical rather than
22

For some it may appear curious that I should attempt to quantify both
Raz's ten page and Dworkin's five page account, and more seriously that
it betrays a philosophical immaturity that focuses on quantity rather than
quality . To be clear, I believe that the text of my essay addresses the issue
of the quality of Dworkin and Raz's analyses, specifically in that it suggests
interpretive voids; as to the quantity, I simply want to refute Galloway's
proposition that either jurist provides an "extended analysis of the concept"
[258).

23 Morality, 1 4 8.
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located and for that reason I consider it to be distracting. But none
of this comes as a real surprise because, as Raz admits, his concern
is not with a description of coercion, but its use as an evaluative
term. As he puts it, "while (coercion) has a fixed descriptive core,
its meaning cannot be fully explained without noting its full moral
significance".24 In one sense I agree with this, for coercion un
doubtedly has both descriptive and evaluative dimensions. Where
I take issue with Raz is that he ignores completely any contextual
descriptive discussion to focus solely on the evaluative element in
the light of his theory of autonomy. The descriptive is acknowledged
only to be immediately ignored in the pursuit of some more pressing
philosophical agenda, his "aim ... merely to tie the notion of
coercion to a view about excuses".2s
This reluctance to deal with the reality of coercion is confirmed
several lines later when, reminiscent of Dworkin's strategy of
avoidance, Raz posits that he only wants to focus on "coercion
by threats" as "this is the form of coercion relevant to political
theory".26 Who says? Who has the authority to determine the
parameters of relevance of political theory? Is this not victory "by
verbal legislation",27 to use one of Raz's more felicitous turns of
phrase? This proposition may be true of the myopic agenda of
liberal political theory, but is this not solipsistic tunnel vision? Might
this be because the practice of coercion, as opposed to the threat,
is simply too much for liberal theorists to bear, or is the practice
of coercion so removed from their own privileged life experiences
that they cannot comprehend it, or recognize its political and
philosophical significance to those who are on the receiving end?28
Moreover, the remainder of Raz's discussion proceeds to add insult
to injury to those who are the victims of coercion, perhaps un
intentionally (after all, they were never the intended audience of
his book), for he argues that:
These reflections on the moral significance of autonomy show that
though coercion often, even usually, adversely affects people's well
being it does not deserve the special importance attributed to it in
much of liberal political thought unless one holds personal autonomy
to be of very great value. But even if one does it is easy to exaggerate
the evils of coercion, in comparison with other evils or misfortunes
which may fall to people in their Iife.29

Id
25 Id., 153.
26 Id., 149.
27 Id., 166.
24

28 I say this because I am somewhat baffled by the nature of enterprises by
people such as Raz. How can someone whose biography reflects an Israeli
background (See M. Levine "Forward" (1989), 62 Cal L R 731, 736) and
who appears to support a Palestinian right to "self-determination" (Morality,
207) systematically ignore the legalized violence of the Israeli state?
29 Morality, 156. Raz repeats this claim in "Facing Up" (1989), 62 So. Cal
LR 1153, 1232.
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It is small comfort to be told that just because you can be harmed
in other ways one should not become too preoccupied with the
coercion that could put you away for the rest of your life, or may
even terminate your life_ 3o
But there is an even more nefarious side to this trivialization
of state coercion that manifests itself towards the end of Raz's book.
In an absolutely stunning - because so atypical - discussion of
a specific problem Raz addresses the issues of the liberal state's
response to "immigrant communities, or indigenous peoples, or . . .
religious sects" that do not foster his vision of freedom, his
perfectionist conception of "autonomy".31 Working on the unargued
for, and I would suggest paternalistic, assumption "that their culture
is inferior to that of the dominant liberal society in the midst of
which they live" 32 he opines that:
[t]he perfectionist principles espoused in this book suggest that people
[identity and culture unspecified] are justified in taking action to
assimilate the minority group, at the cost of letting its culture die
or at least be considerably changed by absorption. 33

And, as the remainder of the discussion makes clear, such assim
ilation will not take place solely on the basis of acts of omission
or failures by the state to support such diversity, but also by acts
of commission deliberately designed to undercut those who resist
the modes of educational incorporationism because, according to
Raz, "[i]n such cases assimilationist policies may well be the only
human course, even if implemented by force of law".34 Let me
re-encode these comments in a more radical discourse. Should these
religious, indigenous or immigrant communities not embrace the
liberal Razian agenda, if they do not play by his rules, state power
- read coercion - will be invoked to enforce his vision. Phrased
less euphemistically, the victims and their value structure will be
violently suppressed "by force of law". It is, indeed, ironic that
Raz should pick this as his solitary contextual example for it betrays
the limitations of his analysis confirming rather than refuting my
own proposition that liberals, like Raz, pay little attention to the
3° For a discussion of imprisonment practices and death squads in the Irish
context see, for example, A. Jennings (ed. ), Justice Under Fire: The Abuse
of Civil Liberties in Northern Ireland ( 1990); R.F. Devlin, "The Rule of Law
and the Politics of Fear: Reflections on Northern Ireland" (1 992 ) Law and
Critique (forthcoming); for a discussion of imprisonment rates for First
Nations people in the Canadian context see M. Jackson, Locking Up Natives
in Canada ( 1 988); for documentation of the racism of what is euphemistically
called the "American justice system" in general, and in particular in the
application of the death penalty, see (1988), 1 01 Harv. LR 1 4 7 5 and
"Supreme Court: Leading Cases" (1987 ), 1 0I Harv. LR 1 4 9.
31 Morality, 423.

32 Id.
33

34

Id., 424.

Id.
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located and for that reason I consider it to be distracting. But none
of this comes as a real surprise because, as Raz admits, his concern
is not with a description of coercion, but its use as an evaluative
term. As he puts it, "while (coercion) has a fixed descriptive core,
its meaning cannot be fully explained without noting its full moral
significance".24 In one sense I agree with this, for coercion un
doubtedly has both descriptive and evaluative dimensions. Where
I take issue with Raz is that he ignores completely any contextual
descriptive discussion to focus solely on the evaluative element in
the light of his theory of autonomy. The descriptive is acknowledged
only to be immediately ignored in the pursuit of some more pressing
philosophical agenda, his "aim . . . merely to tie the notion of
coercion to a view about excuses".25
This reluctance to deal with the reality of coercion is confirmed
several lines later when, reminiscent of Dworkin's strategy of
avoidance, Raz posits that he only wants to focus on "coercion
by threats" as "this is the form of coercion relevant to political
theory".26 Who says? Who has the authority to determine the
parameters of relevance of political theory? Is this not victory "by
verbal legislation",27 to use one of Raz's more felicitous turns of
phrase? This proposition may be true of the myopic agenda of
liberal political theory, but is this not solipsistic tunnel vision? Might
this be because the practice of coercion, as opposed to the threat,
is simply too much for liberal theorists to bear, or is the practice
of coercion so removed from their own privileged life experiences
that they cannot comprehend it, or recognize its political and
philosophical significance to those who are on the receiving end?28
Moreover, the remainder of Raz's discussion proceeds to add insult
to injury to those who are the victims of coercion, perhaps un
intentionally (after all, they were never the intended audience of
his book), for he argues that:
These reflections on the moral significance of autonomy show that
though coercion often, even usually, adversely affects people's well
being it does not deserve the special importance attributed to it in
much of liberal political thought unless one holds personal autonomy
to be of very great value. But even if one does it is easy to exaggerate
the evils of coercion, in comparison with other evils or misfortunes
which may fall to people in their life.29

Id.
Id, 1 53.
26 Id., 149.
2 7 Id., 1 66.
28 I say this because I am somewhat baffled by the nature of enterprises by
people such as Raz. How can someone whose biography reflects an Israeli
background (See M. Levine "Forward" ( 1 989), 62 Cal LR 73 1 , 736) and
who appears to support a Palestinian right to "self-determination" (Morality,
207) systematically ignore the legalized violence of the Israeli state?
. 29 Morality, 1 56. Raz repeats this claim in "Facing Up" (1989), 62 So. Cal
LR 1 1 53, 1 232.
24

25
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It is small comfort to be told that just because you can be harmed
in other ways one should not become too preoccupied with the
coercion that could put you away for the rest of your life, or may
even terminate your life. 30
But there is an even more nefarious side to this trivialization
of state coercion that manifests itself towards the end of Raz's book.
In an absolutely stunning - because so atypical - discussion of
a specific problem Raz addresses the issues of the liberal state's
response to "immigrant communities, or indigenous peoples, or . . .
religious sects" that do not foster his vision of freedom, his
perfectionist conception of "autonomy".3 1 Working on the unargued
for, and I would suggest paternalistic, assumption "that their culture
is inferior to that of the dominant liberal society in the midst of
which they live"32 he opines that:
[t]he perfectionist principles espoused in this book suggest that people
[identity and culture unspecified] are justified in taking action to
assimilate the minority group, at the cost of letting its culture die
or at least be considerably changed by absorption. 33

And, as the remainder of the discussion makes clear, such assim
ilation will not take place solely on the basis of acts of omission
or failures by the state to support such diversity, but also by acts
of commission deliberately designed to undercut those who resist
the modes of educational incorporationism because, according to
Raz, "[i]n such cases assimilationist policies may well be the only
human course, even if implemented by force of law".34 Let me
re-encode these comments in a more radical discourse. Should these
religious, indigenous or immigrant communities not embrace the
liberal Razian agenda, if they do not play by his rules, state power
- read coercion - will be invoked to enforce his vision. Phrased
less euphemistically, the victims and their value structure will be
violently suppressed "by force of law". It is, indeed, ironic that
Raz should pick this as his solitary contextual example for it betrays
the limitations of his analysis confirming rather than refuting my
own proposition that liberals, like Raz, pay little attention to the
° For a discussion of imprisonment practices and death squads in the Irish
context see, for example, A. Jennings (ed.), Justice Under Fire: The Abuse
of Civil Liberties in Northern Ireland (1990); R.F. Devlin, "The Rule of Law
and the Politics of Fear: Reflections on Northern Ireland" (1992 ) Law and
Critique (forthcoming); for a discussion of imprisonment rates for First
Nations people in the Canadian context see M. Jackson, Locking Up Natives
in Canada (1988); for documentation of the racism of what is euphemistically
called the "American justice system" in general, and in particular in the
application of the death penalty, see ( I 988), 101 Harv. LR 14 7 5 and
"Supreme Court: Leading Cases" (1987 ), 101 Harv. LR 1 4 9.
3 1 Morality, 423 .
3 2 Id.
33 Id., 4 24.
3 4 Id.
3
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existential reality of coercion, subordinating it to the philosophical
pursuit of their preferred perfectionist programme.
For me, coercion is a horrific existential reality that we need
to confront, acknowledge and decentre. Consequently, it is not
simply a philosophical abstraction that can be subsumed and
marginalized within an inquiry into the big philosophical question
of the meaning of authority or trivialized by an interrogation of
the limits of anti-perfectionism. Rather than seeking ways to
legitimize coercion, my project is one of conscientization so as to
seek to reduce and perhaps, in my more utopian moments, to even
eliminate violence from our politico-juridical practices and therefore
not require either Razian or Dworkinian exercises in legitimation.
At the very minimum, I would hope to persuade scholars such as
Raz and Dworkin that their automatic re-encoding of the issue
of violence/ coercion as a subissue of "the philosophical explanation
of authority"35 is problematic and that they simply do not assume
that theirs is the agenda, just because they have always done it
that way.36
Perhaps, then, the worst that can be said is that critics like myself
and mainstream theorists like Dworkin and Raz are simply operating
within two different interpretive frameworks and that when our
conversations do overlap we are at cross purposes. But what is
surprising is that Galloway does not pick up on this difference
between advocates of the nonradical agenda and myself, given that
35 Id., 63.
36 There is one other occasion in which Raz devotes significant space to the
issue of coercion and, on first read, this would appear to dovetail with rather
than ignore my concerns about coercion. Toward the end of the book, in
a discussion of his reinterpretation of autonomy and harm, he posits:
And yet the harm principle is defensible in the light of the principle
of autonomy for one simple reason. The means used, coercive inter
ference, violates the autonomy of its victim. First, it violates the
condition of independence and expresses a relation of domination and
an attitude of disrespect for the coerced individual. Second, coercion
by criminal penalties is a global and indiscriminate invasion of
autonomy. Imprisoning a person prevents him from almost all auto
nomous pursuits. Other forms of coercion may be less severe, but
they all invade autonomy, and they all, at least in this world, do it
in a fairly indiscriminate way. That is, there is no practical way of
ensuring that the coercion will restrict the victims' choice of repugnant
options but will not interfere with their other choices. A moral theory
which values autonomy highly can justify restricting the autonomy
of one person for the sake of the greater autonomy of others or even
of that person himself in the future. That is why it can justify coercion
to prevent harm, for harm interferes with autonomy. But it will not
tolerate coercion for other reasons [Morality, 418.].
But the important point is that his concerns about coercion are that they
infringe his concept of autonomy, but autonomy, like everything else in
his book, is first and foremost a philosophical concept, the reality of being
a victim of coercion relegated to a second order derivative experience.
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he was one of the supervisors for my graduate thesis upon which
this article was based. But perhaps this suggests that liberals and
radicals are not only of different traditions, but that even when we
do use similar discourses we are operating in different hermeneutical
circles. As Colleen Sheppard reminds us, "[d]ifferent realities may
give different meanings to the same words".37 To conjecture further,
that difference might be between what Antonio Gramsci calls
"organic intellectuals"38 and "professional philosophers".39
The problem that I want to emphasize in Galloway's portrayal
of my critical position is that he re-encodes my interpretation of
liberal analysis in a manner that suggests a lack of academic integrity
on my part, which is a serious intellectual charge, when the difference
is one of stance and commitment. The accusatory nature of his
· argument betrays a presumption on his part that there are fun
damentally correct interpretations, and that those who take a
different track must be acting in academic bad faith.The reason
why I have had to spend an unconscionably large amount of this
article elaborating on my own position is to illustrate that to be
different is not necessarily to be defective.
Galloway's second alleged example of what he calls "misrepre
sentation" [258] is Allan Hutchinson's suggestion that Dworkin's
"fraternal community .. . amounts to the very Lockean social
contract of the conditional kind that Dworkin is at pains to discredit
and disclaim".40 Galloway rejects Hutchinson's interpretation on
the basis that Dworkin is precise in his analysis in that his idea
of community "embodies the idea that associative obligations can
be voluntarily incurred, as opposed to the idea that obligations can
only be voluntarily incurred, which is the idea that underlies social
contract theory" [258].Having emphasized this distinction Galloway
posits that Hutchinson equates the two, and that this is "an egregious
misrepresentation" [25 8 ].
Professor Hutchinson and I have discussed this critique by
Galloway, and it seems to me that it is perhaps appropriate to
allow Hutchinson to speak for himself:4 1
At least 5 blunt comments come to mind. First, there is nothing
clear about this supposed distinction, it seems the usual display of
Dworkinian sophistry. Secondly, insofar as I understand the distinc
tion, it hardly meets, let alone defeats, the assessment made by
Hutchinson. Thirdly, even allowing the distinction (which I do not),
a misreading of it hardly amounts to an "example of egregious
"The I and the It" in Perspectives, supra note 6, 4 1 7.
A. Gramsci, "The Intellectuals" in Selections from Prison Notebooks (197 1 ),
5.
39 S. Burton describes Raz's "Law as Practical Reason" (1 988), So. Cal LR
747, 750.
40 Hutchinson, Dwelling on the Threshold (1988), 73.
4 1 These conversations took place at the Learned Societies Conference, Queen's
University at Kingston, June, 1 99 1 , and the following paragraph is from
a letter by Professor Hutchinson dated August 19, 1 99 1 . Copy on file with
author.
37
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misrepresentation." If this is the best Galloway can do by way of
example, he is skating on very thin ice. Fourthly, he assumes that
my conclusion is an interpretation rather than a criticism. The purpose
of my conclusion was to complete an analysis that sought to show
that, whatever Dworkin thought or said he was doing, a close
examination of the substance of his views disclosed a very different
theory. Simply because a writer calls herself an X does not mean
that she is one. Is it conclusive that, because someone says that
"I am not a racist", they are not one? Finally, Galloway seems to
engage in intellectual exchange by bold assertion and allegation;
there is no attempt at argument or explanation. He seems to think
that, because he claims something is so (i.e. Dworkin means this
not that), then it is so. This is an exercise in dogma, not in scholarship.
Like any writer, Dworkin's ideas must be read in a reasonable light.
In the same way that one must not always read them in the worst
light, one must not always read them in the best light. Legal theory
is about critical debate, not blind allegiance or wilful hostility.

For good meas�re and, I suppose, to illustrate the pervasiveness
of the nasty critical habit of misrepresentation, Galloway points
to a comment of Pamela Chapman which indicates that Dworkin
adopts a "normative natural law theory" that attempts to "establish
guidelines and sources for legal reasoning, that avoid 'political'
choices yet are determinative of the appropriate outcomes".42
Yet again Galloway champions the Dworkinian project but also
in problematic ways. First, again there is the problem of contex
tualism. The sentences to which Galloway refers are in the intro
duction to Chapman's essay, but the substantive discussion which
elaborates upon her proposition comes several pages later at 87 1 873. Second, Galloway's rhetorical exclamation, "Poor Dworkin!"
(25 8], appears to deny that there is any legitimate foundation upon
which to conceive of Dworkin as a natural lawyer, but surely this
is at least a possible interpretation given that as recently as 1 982,
just four years before Chapman published her article, Dworkin
himself opined:
If the crude description of natural law I just gave is correct, that
any theory which makes the content of law sometimes depend on
the correct answer to some moral question is a natural law theory,
then I am guilty of natural law . . . . Suppose this is natural law.
What in the world is wrong with it?43

Viewed in this light Galloway seems to have a breathtakingly broad
conception of "misrepresentation".
Third, Galloway's main concern with Chapman's proposition,
however, is that it posits that Dworkin believes in the separation
of law and politics, and that legal decision-making is "apolitical".
Galloway's response, drawing on Dworkin's thesis in Taking Rights
42
43

P. Chapman, "The Politics of Judging: Section 1 of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms" (1 986), 24 Osgoode Hall LJ. 867, 368.
R. Dworkin, "Natural Law Revisited" (1982), 34 U. fla. LR l 65 (emphasis
in original).
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Seriously that legal decision-making should be based upon principles
and not policies, argues that such principles are principles of political
morality and therefore are manifestly political. This is assumed by
Galloway to be a refutation of Chapma11's critical interpretation.
But once again Galloway may be too hasty in his accusation. First,
as I have pointed out, Chapman does have a substantive discussion
of Dworkin several pages into her essay and explicitly deals with
the principles/policy distinction, rejecting its aspirations.44 Second,
it should be noted that Chapman places "political" in inverted
commas, clearly suggesting that "political" is a loaded concept.
It may be true that Dworkin considers that judges, when making
decisions, are acting on the basis of principles of political morality,
but it is also equally clear that he has a narrower conception of
"the political"; that is, decision-making in its legislative form which
he argues is not characteristic of - nor appropriate for - the
judiciary.45 Thus, it should be clear that the dispute depends upon
one's understanding of the nature of the concept "political". There
fore, perhaps Chapman's portrayal refers to Dworkin's narrower
conception of the separation of legal decision-making from political
decision making, which is, in my opinion, a legitimate, if not
necessarily a universally accepted, reading of Dworkin's thesis. Thus,
perhaps Galloway's defence of "Poor Dworkin" and his onslaught
on Pamela Chapman is a little too quick and easy, premised as
it is upon a traditionalist and constrained conception of politics.
If I am correct that Galloway's allegations of misrepresentation
are unfounded, if I have dispelled concerns about the academic
integrity of the critical agenda, if he is quite simply wrong in his
accusations, then I think it is fair for those of us who have been
challenged to ask why these charges have been levelled.
The answer, I suggest, is to be found in several comments that
pepper the first few pages of his commentary. Galloway posits that
the crits believe mainstream jurisprudence to be "so defective as
to not merit serious consideration" [255]; "that they have used a
number of strategies . . . to dissuade people from exploring in depth
or taking seriously the writing of nonradical theorists" [256], or
that "it would be a travesty if students or potential readers were
dissuaded from reading them" [259] because of the various crit
"misrepresentations". I believe these propositions by Galloway
reveal more than liberals may want to admit. Galloway seems to
be driven by a fear that on the basis of these radical interpretations
mainstream scholarship will lose part of its readership. Viewed more
cynically, his concern seems to be that perhaps the liberals will
lose their hegemonic position within the curriculum of the legal
academy, that their capacity for determining the parameters of the
discourse will be destabilized. If this is an accurate unpacking of
Galloway's text, then his reaction is something more than mere
"scholarly interchange" as he portrays it [256]. Rather, it confirms
44
45

Supra note 42, 872.
See, for example, Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977), 82.
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a key tenet of the critical agenda: the proposition that legal education
is a terrain of political contestation and that scholarship, in spite
of its pretensions, is always and already predetermined by politics.
Moreover, it seems to me that Galloway's concern about the
blinkering of students and other potential readers by the critical
commentary underestimates the capacity of these people to think
for themselves. Students of legal theory are neither dupes nor
automatons who passively accept what they are provided by the
professorate. In my experience, especially when one introduces
students to critical, feminist or race analyses, students frequently
demand and seek out liberal perspectives on these issues. As good
lawyers, they · want to encounter both sides of the debate. The
proposition that students might uncritically accept the critical
perspective fails to pay full respect to the intellectual and inter
rogative strengths of the student body, and simultaneously under
estimates the depth of the liberal mindframe of the vast majority
of those who go through higher education in North America.
b) Absence of Consideration
By this, Galloway seems to mean that the crits fail to give a
full account of the variety of mainstream analyses of law. Spe
cifically, he complains that the primary focus of the critical analysis
is on what he variously calls "functionalist", "instrumentalist" or
"evolutionary functionalist" [259] thereby ignoring "nonfunction
alist" mainstream accounts of law. As far as I can make out, by
"nonfunctionalist" Galloway seems to be contemplating those who
"debate about the nature of law", those who inquire "what is law",
those who, quoting Les Green, posit that "law is not distinguished
by what it does, but how it does it". Tying these nebulous ideas
together, Galloway suggests he is talking about the work of those
like - you guessed it - Dworkin, Raz and Hart because "they
recognize what has escaped the crits . . . that a complete theory
of law and political theory must include some analysis of law's
uniqueness, and some account of its form" [259].
I think that Galloway touches upon an interesting question here
- the tendency for crits to disengage their analyses from those
of the dominant discourse - which I will come back to a little
later. At this stage, I wish to address some problems in relation
to the way he develops his critique.
First, it is not totally clear to me what he means by "evolutionary
functionalist" accounts and it would help if he had provided examples·
of mainstream scholarship that manifest this approach and of critical
responses to it.46 More specifically, Galloway is of course correct
to posit that functionalist analyses of law suffer from fundamental
weaknesses - mainstream social science taught us that a long time
ago - but this only complements the crits for they have been at
46 The closest he comes to providing us with guidance is to refer us to Robert
Gordon, a crit, and his essay "Critical Legal Histories" (1984), 36 Stan.
LR 57.
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pains to emphasize the weakness of mainstream legal analyses that
operate on functionalist assumptions.47 However, the looseness of
Galloway's conception of functionalism causes him problems be
cause his propositions that "Raz and Dworkin reject functionalist
accounts of law" [259] suggests that their analyses are purged of
any "instrumentalist" elements, that they do not touch the question
of, in Green's terms, "the uses to which law may be put". But
surely this is a partial reading of their work.Take Raz for example.
As Stephen Perry48 points out, Raz's earlier book, The Authority
ofLaw is very clear that law's primary function is to provide "publicly
ascertainable ways of guiding behaviour and regulating aspects of
social life".49 Moreover, it is to be noted that Raz does not reject
this functionalist characterization of aspects of his work when he
replies to Perry in "Facing Up". Indeed, Raz explicitly adopts the
discourse of "the functions of law"50 and indeed, contra Galloway,
argues that "(o)ur understanding of law is greatly defective unless
it includes and is based on a sound view of the role of law in
pr�ctical reasoning. The first precept of legal theory is that law
is practical, that its essential function is to play a role in its subjects'
reasoning about what to do".5 1 Moreover, it is difficult to comprehend
how Galloway fails to recognize the instrumentalist aspects of the
Morality of Freedom given that the book is touted by Neil Mac
Cormick (who Galloway quotes at page 261) as a "transition from
analysis to advocacy".52 Specifically, it seems to me that Raz's
proposition that the law and state should promote perfectionist
policies that will facilitate the development of individual well being
and autonomy53 is hardly devoid of instrumentalist connotations.
My point here is quite simple. It is that though the primary focus
of scholars such as Raz may not be on "the uses to which law
may be put" [259] their analyses of the "how" of law are premised
upon certain, at least instrumental, assumptions as to the desirable
social function of law.If this is so, then Galloway himself has failed
at the very minimum to give sufficient consideration to those whose
work he advocates or, perhaps more disturbingly, he has provided
a selective reading of their work.
Furthermore, Galloway speculates, not for the first time in the
essay, that crits reckon that the mainstream approaches are "wholly
unimportant, and not worthy of serious consideration" [259].This,
I suggest either misunderstands or demonstrates a lack of familiarity
with the extensive critical literature. Hart has received some critical
See for example, M. Feinman "Critical Approaches to Contract Law" (1983),
30 U.CLA. 819.
48 "Second Order Reasons, Uncertainty and Legal Theory" (1988), So. Cal.
L.R. 913, 950.
49 The Authority of law (1979), 51.
5 0 Supra note 29, 1201.
5 1 Id., 1154.
52 Preface: Symposium, supra note 18, 743, 744.
53 Morality, 19 .
47
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analysis54 and Dworkin has been the focus of several challenges
by critical scholars.55 More generally, the accusation that the crits
posit that mainstream scholarship is not "worthy of serious con
sideration" [259] is not supported by any examples of critical claims
to this effect. To the contrary, crits spend a great deal of their
time critiquing liberalism both internally and externally, because
it is so important as an ideological practice.In part, this may be
why crits find it so difficult to articulate their reconstructive agenda:
they are continually trying to keep up with the cottage industry
that is called mainstream legal theory. This extensive critical focus
on the limits of liberalism makes crits an easy target for Galloway's
criticism that they are "negative postmodernists" [262]. Thus, crits
are dammed if they do and dammed if they don't. If they focus
their critical skills on liberalism they are nihilists, if they pursue
their own agenda they are missing the (liberal) boat. This then
points to the deeper issue of who controls the discursive agenda,
who gets to determine what is important? Viewed in this light,
Galloway's essay is an attempt to maintain the discursive hegemony
of the nonradical elit�, all others being supplicants for inclusion
in a pre-structured and constraining liberal discourse.
Finally, under this rubric of absence of consideration, let me briefly
address Galloway's proposition, drawing heavily on Les Green, that
the key distinction of "nonfunctionalist" accounts of law is that
they provide "some analysis of law's uniqueness, and some account
of its form" as preliminaries to "a serious inquiry into the general
relationship between law and politics" [259-260]. The suggestion,
of course, is that these intricacies escape the crit. Once again it
is the old story of the higher lights being crassly misunderstood
by the pedants.But this betrays a misunderstanding of the critical
position. Galloway is correct to suggest that crits do not believe
that law is unique, because to focus exclusively on "how it does
it" is, from a critical perspective, to reify law,56 to disconnect it
from the vagaries - both individual and collective - of human
agency, to shift the spotlight from legal actors onto some phenome
nological fiction called "Law". This is considered to be an exercise
in the institutionalization of irresponsibility.57 But this does not mean
54

See for example, F. de Coste, "Radical Discourse in Legal Theory: Hart
and Dworkin" (1989), 21 Ottawa LR 679; J. Singer, "The Player and the
Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory" (1984), 94 Yale LJ 1, 28; S. Fish,
"Force" (1988), 45 Washington and Lee LR 883; P. Goodrich, "Adventures
of Legal Meaning, Herbert Hart and Legal Subjectivism" in Legal Discourse
(1987), 44.
55 M. Feinman, Book Review (1977), 91 Harv. LR 302; A.C. Hutchinson,
"Indiana Dworkin and Law's Empire" (1987), 86 Yale LJ. 637; J. Boyle,
"Legal Fiction" (1986-87), 38 Hastings LJ. I O13; R. Cotterrall, "Liberalism's
Empire: Reflections on Ronald Dworkin's Legal Philosophy" (1987), Am.
B.F. Res. J 509; F. de Coste, supra note 54.
56 P. Gabel, "Reification in Legal Reasoning" (1980), 3 Research in Law and
Sociology, 35.
57 M.J. Mossman, "Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes"
(1986), 3 Aust. J. L and S. 30.
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that crits do not focus on the specificities of law, that they do not
take seriously its special modalities of politics.58 Rather, crits have
been at pains to emphasize that the form of law is perhaps one
of its most politically significant and problematic elements.59 But
again, this is not a quest to find some "general relationship between
law and politics" [260] because such a quest is inconsistent with
one of the central theses of radical thought at least since Marx,
that of historical contingency. As to the relationship between law
and politics, there can be no general theory, no super explanation,
because the nature of the relationship is exactly that, relational
and contextual; it is dependent upon a multitude of social, economic
and cultural factors such as class, race, gender etc. As these elements
mutate, so too does the nature of the relationship between law and
politics. This is called "the relative autonomy thesis".60
c) Reductionism and
d) Absence of Discrimination
Not only are "reductionism" and "absence of discrimination",
as Galloway points out, two sides of the one coin, they are also
specific manifestations of his prior and more general complaint
of an absence of consideration. His basic concern here seems to
be that in so far as crits have posited that the cause of our ills
is "liberalism", they have developed a philosophically unsophis
ticated caricature that fails to do justice to liberalism as an
"intellectual tradition". If accurate, such a criticism would, I believe,
be important. However, again Galloway misdirects his critical gaze.
Although Galloway may be correct to point out that Unger's
characterization of liberalism may be too broad as a conception
of liberal political and legal philosophy, that position was taken
in 1 975,6 1 and a much more subtle and significantly revised account
is provided in Unger's most recent work, Politics ( 1 987). But even
this does not justify Galloway's stance for he appears to not fully
realize the full impact of what he acknowledges in passing - the
central point that Unger was making - that liberalism is much
more than an academic philosophical tradition - which is, to a
significant degree, Galloway's position - that it is a weltanschauung,
that is, a deep seated and pervasive cultural ideology that extends
far beyond and deeper than the academy. This is a point I shall
return to later.
Furthermore Unger, though an important influence within the
crits, is also somewhat atypical in the breadth of his vision and
See, for example, A.C. Hutchinson's contribution to Perspectives, "Crits and
Cricket: A Deconstructive Spin (Or was it a Googly?)" 181.
59 See, for example, D. Kennedy, "Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication" (1976), 89 Harv. L Rev. 1685.
60 This point is dealt with, to some extent, in my article, "Law's Centaur's
. . .", supra note 8, 230, 249.
61 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Knowledge and Politics (1975), Chapt. 2.
58
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ambitions. While he is first and foremost a social theorist, most
crits - perhaps in spite of themselves - are lawyers. As a result,
their primary concern tends not to be liberalism more generally,
but a particular historically and institutionally specific (and perhaps
excessively doctrinal) subcomponent of that tradition, what they
sometimes call "liberal legalism". Karl Klare, for example, argues
that:
"Liberal legalism" is a particular historical incarnation of the legalist
outlook, which characteristically serves as the philosophical foun
dation of the legitimacy of the legal order in capitalist societies.
Its essential features are the commitment to general, democratically
promulgated rules, the equal treatment of all citizens before the law,
and the radical separation of morals, politics, and personality from
judicial action. Liberal legalism also consists of a complex of social
practices and institutions that complement and elaborate upon its
underlying political philosophy and jurisprudence. With respect to
its modern Anglo-American form, these include adherence to prece
dent, separation of the legislative (prospective) and the judicial
(retrospective) functions, the obligations to formulate legal rules on
a general basis (the notion of ratio decidendi), adherence to complex
procedural formalities, and the search for specialized methods of
analysis ("legal reasoning"). All of these institutions are designed
to serve the fundamental desideratum of separation of morals, politics,
and personal bias from adjudication." 62

With this in mind, it is interesting to note that when Galloway
attempts to trace the parameters of the crit conception of liberalism,
he does not draw on the work of any critical scholar, but instead
reproduces a conception contrived by an anti-crit,63 Les Green, which
in turn is unsupported by any references except an unhelpful one
"culled from American law reviews".64 To me this is problematic
for crits have characterized liberalism in a variety of different ways
in a variety of different contexts,· depending upon the forum, the
audience and more generally, authorial intent. Contextualism is
K . Klare, "Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins
of Modern Legal Consciousness, 193 7 - 1 94 1 " (19 7 8), 62 Minn. LR 2 65,
2 7 6 and footnotes therein.
63 The proposition that Green is an anti-crit is based upon his self-perceived
provocative lumping of the crits with marxists, feminists et al. in the category
of "functionalists". See his "The Political Context of Legal Theory", supra
note 5, 2 & 12.
64 "Un-American Liberalism: Raz's Morality of Freedom" ( 19 88), 3 8 U. T.LJ.
317 . This self confessed caricature goes as follows:
"Liberals are atomists who think that the individual is prior to society .
They prize freedom as the negative virtue of being left to pursue one's
own good in one's own way. Their political morality is based on
individual rights and equality and has the function of regulating
competition among self-interested atoms. Liberals recognize a narrow
role for the state, which may restrict liberty only to prevent harm
to others and must remain neutral among competing conceptions of
the good life ." Id
62
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important and I think that it is only fair to let crits speak for
themselves rather than ventriloquise through a hostile commentator.
This is particularly true when Galloway posits that crits present
liberalism as "a canonical static dogma" (260). Quite simply: where
is the reference?
On my understanding, crits have a significantly more sophisticated
understanding of liberalism than a mere dogma, although at times
some liberals come pretty close to it.65 I think that crits66 recognize
that liberalism has had a venerable history, that it has played a
crucial role in freeing western society from the repressive shackles
of a feudalistic state and church and that it has taken us in a
significant direction towards the achievement of equality. However,
the critical belief is that it has stalled in its litJerationist agenda.
Restated, crits comprehend liberalism contextually and dynamically,
through the prisms of history and power. Liberalism has taken on
a political mythical quality that transcends even the best intentions
and most .progressive practices of those who are its academic
defenders. Even if liberal theorists once controlled the agenda of
liberalism, they no longer do so in the rich North Atlantic societies
because through the 1 970's and 1 980's they have been supplanted
by the ideology of "fundamentalist liberalism", particularly as it
is espoused by corporations and the New Right. Thus, in so far
as liberals continue to seek to carve out a corner of a field that
has been occupied by those who are manifestly more powerful than
a cabal of abstractionist academics, they will ultimately and in spite
of themselves legitimize an oppressive political order. Raz is as
good an example of this as any, in that he is willing to confer
the status of a "right holder" on corporations67 without in any way
seriously addressing how in a late capitalist society corporate power
rather than state power may be the primary threat to individual
autonomy.
Galloway's response would probably be that all of this misses
the point because liberalism as a politico-ideological practice is
not what he is talking about, but liberalism as a philosophical
tradition. This is a point I will return to later, but his key suggestion
here is that there are philosophers in this tradition who do not
fit the picture portrayed of them by the crits (whatever that might
be). Once again, he draws on the recent work of Raz to refute
the proposition that liberalism has any core shibboleths. Specifically,
See for example, B. Schwartz, First Principles, Second Thoughts: Aboriginal
Peoples, Constitutional Reform and Canadian Statecraft (1986).
66 A caveat is appropriate here. Given the generic nature of Galloway's criticism
of "the crits", I feel obliged to respond on a similar level. This may be
impossible given that those who self identify with the critical legal studies
movement are highly diversified and it would be very difficult to discover
an official "crit position" on any issue. So what follows is perhaps more
of a generalization than I might want to make, but is to some degree dictated
by the nature of Galloway's approach.
67 Morality, 1 76.
65
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although Galloway admits that leading liberals such as Rawls and
Dworkin have promoted "at least some of (the) ideas" (which
ones?) of "radical individualism, a rights based morality and a
neutral state" [26 1 ], he also argues that Raz "explodes the myth
of their definitional centrality" [26 1 ]. I, for one, am unclear
as to the epistemological status of the idea of "definitional cen
trality" and that may be because of my own ignorance of the
internal norms of contemporary analytic philosophy. But it certainly
does not mean that these same ideas are not of crucial ideological
significance, which is the crit claim, because just a few lines later
Galloway admits that Raz considers "respect due to individual
liberty" as being "the specific contribution of the liberal tradition
to political morality."68 So, in spite of everything, "individualism"
and "liberty" remain central. Why then are the crits so off the
mark?
Galloway's response, reporting Raz's position, is as slippery as
it is unhelpful. His claim is that there is no essential essence attri
buted to "liberty" in the liberal tradition, that there are a variety
of different conceptions of liberty. For Galloway, Raz "ex
plodes (the) myth (of crit reductionism) with finesse" [26 1 ]. I
continue to have some problems with this claim. First, and perhaps
least importantly, I am disturbed by the violence of Galloway's
discourse. Second, Galloway conveniently drops the element of
"individual" out of the debate focusing solely on the question
of liberty.69 Third, Galloway's confession of polysemy in fact
acknowledges the accuracy of one of the central theses of the
crits, the "indeterminacy thesis". What is it then about liberalism
that makes it a tradition "of a considerable degree of unity
and continuity" ,70 if its core concept of "liberty" is essentially
contested even by the faithful, and individualism seems to
have been dropped, at least by Galloway. Why hang onto liber
alism, then, for crits and marxists also have conceptions of
liberty, the individual and the role of the state and the desir
able nature of the relationship between them? Does the inde
terminacy thesis therefore convert marxists and crits into
liberals in spite of themselves, or, perhaps more interestingly,
does it make Raz a reluctant crit? There are of course a mul
titude of reasons as to why Raz would refuse to be a crit but one
might be because he is conscious of the fact that being a philo
sopher means more than being heir to a tradition; that philosophy
is a form of political practice, and that being a liberal academic
remains an acceptable - even laudable - perhaps harmless Morality, 2.
Raz's strategy is somewhat different. As I read him, Raz seems to distinguish
"autonomy-oriented conception of personal well being" from "moral in
dividualism", building his perfectionist theory on the former rather than
the latter. Morality, 16; 427.
70 Morality, 1.
68
69
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position in the eyes of the power elite, but that being a crit is
threatening.7 1
None of this, of course, is to deny the banal point made by
Galloway that there are important differences between liberals that
crits fail to discern. Of course there are, in the same way that there
are fundamentally important differences between crits, people of
colour, First Nations peoples and feminists. Of course there is a
difference between Dworkin's internal "interpretive" methodology
and Raz 's external72 "normative-explanatory" approach [263 ].But
are we really meant to carefully dissect every new publication that
comes out of the Clarendon Press? Are we forever meant to play
catch up with the latest twists and turns of what even Galloway
admits to be the "dry", "excessively abstract", "inspirationless",
"turgid", "pedantic" and complex movements of analytical phi
losophy [255]? Are we to forever to make our jurisprudential
pilgrimages to the Mecca that is called Oxford, and then be pilloried
as ignorant. heretics when we miss the newest messiah? Raz may
be Galloway's newest guru, but it is the same old method.
It is not that Raz's recent book is the only jurisprudential event
of the mid to late 1 980's. In my opinion, there was a lot more
to which the crits had to pay attention. First, it was at about this
time that the energy that had sustained the crits for an amazingly
prolific decade began to wane. In part, I think, this was because
some of the leading figures in the movement had said a great deal
of what they wanted to say - dead horses and all that - and
were in a period of reconsideration as to where they wanted to
go.73 In part, there was the emergence of a new generation of crits
who were unsure as to how they wanted to develop their analyses.
Second, it was about this time when the academic hatchet began
to fall, when the liberal legal academy began to get nervous of
the critical intervention and exclude crits or deny them tenure.This,
There is a further point here. I am not even sure if the idea of "respect
due to individual liberty" is liberalism's specific contribution, because
frequently Raz's discussion of liberty verges on some "dignitarian" conception
of the "self' and if this is an accurate interpretation then this fits with
the basic tenets of the Judeo-Christian tradition, at least when viewed in
its best light, and that predates liberalism. All this, of course, is difficult
to get an angle on because the disengaged nature of Razian thought provides
us with little by way of specifics.
72 As an aside, it always baffles me how legal theorists can posit an external
position when they have spent the entirety of their adult life entrenched
in an enclave that systematically enforces a sign system and mode of thinking
that, intentionally or unintentionally, excludes the reality of otherness. For
further discussions of the ideological dimension of the legal educational
environment see, for example, W. Conklin, "A Contract" Perspectives 207;
M. O'Brien and S. McIntyre, "Patriarchal Hegemony and Legal Education"
(1986), 2 CJ W.L 69; M. Maloney and J. Cassels, "Critical Legal Education:
Paralysis with a Purpose" (1989), 4 CJLS. 99.
7 3 The exception is, of course, Unger's three volumes of Politics. For a discussion
see my "On the Road to Radical Reform" ( l 990), Osgoode Hall LJ. 641.
71
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I think, came as a rude awakening to some crits, in spite of their
comprehension of the politics of legal education.74 Third, and perhaps
most importantly, there were the emergence of the feminist crit
icisms,75 and the so called "minority critiques" of the crits,76 and
these, I believe, hit the crits very hard. It is with these issues of
race and gender that the crits have preoccupied themselves,77 and
not with a text such as The Morality of Freedom that assiduously
avoids any concrete encounter with such issues. None of this is
intended as an apology for not reading Raz, it is just a contextual
explanation as to why not everyone's universe is shattered by what
is in many ways a very ·traditional jurisprudential text.

e) The presentation of Mainstream Theory as an Instrument of
legitimation
Galloway makes a variety of claims under this rubric including
that crits assume, that "liberal theory is the motive force that is
presented to justify capitalism, or our hierarchical and patriarchal
institutions" [263-264 ]; or that "the language of rights, being
individualist in orientation .. . should itself be abandoned if true
political ideals are to be attained" [264] and finally, that "phi
losophical debate is ideological warfare well concealed under a
rational cloak .. . Liberal theory .. . is but propaganda" [264].
Once again, it seems to me that Galloway is somewhat off the
mark.
The first and last of these accusations incorporates an instru
mentalist conception of ideology suggesting that the crits subscribe
to some vulgar conspiracy thesis that liberal academic philosophers
are but apparatchi of the power elites.I do not demand that Galloway
pursue the extensive and careful left literature, and the important
debates that go on therein, as to the nature and processes of ideology.
I do wish, however, that once again he would directly quote critical
scholars on their conception of ideology rather than another non74 Mark Tushnet once said, "When they find out what we are up to they
will come after us with guns". Coercion and oppression will not always
be this direct.
75 See for example, C. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State
(1989), 290, footnote 1 8.
7 6 See for example, "Minority Critiques of the CLS Movement" (1 987), 22
Harv. C.RC.LLR, 297.
7 7 Moreover, it has taken the crits some time to come to terms with these
criticisms for they have not adopted the liberal assimilationist strategy of
"add women/people of colour and stir" and as a result the response has
been slow in forthcoming. For some early responses see, M. Tushnet, "Rights:
An Essay in Informal Political Theory" ( 1 987), 1 7 Pol and Soc'y 403;
A. Freeman, "Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity:
A Critical Legal Essay" (1988), 23 Harv. C.RC.LLR 295; M.J. Horwitz,
"Rights" (1 988), 23 Harv. C.RC.LLR 393. For later responses, see, D.
Kennedy "A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal
Academia" (1990), Duke LJ. 705; G.Peller, "Race Consciousness" (1990),
Duke LJ 758.
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crit, Donald Brosnan.78 My only point is that ideology is much more
entrenched, sophisticated and pervasive than conspiracy theses
suggest;79 that it is deeply embedded in our ways of knowing80,
perhaps unconscious though not necessarily falsely conscious; it.
is part of the interpretive framework through which we comprehend
our understanding of the world, our relationships and ourselves.
On this reading, the critical proposition derives from the marxist
aphorism that "social being determines consciousness", thereby
suggesting that there is nothing necessarily intentionally apologetic
in the work of liberal theorists - although it would be foolish
to deny that this sometimes happens, when it does81 - but that
they are simply giving voice to their conception of reality, based
on their socially constructed lived experiences. Therefore, I suppose
that Galloway is correct in that crits see political theory as a form
of ideological warfare, but this is because crits do not buy into
the liberal assumption that ideology per se is a bad thing, for they
see it as an.inescapable inevitability of being. The more interesting
question, from the critical vantage point, is whether a particular
ideological position advances progressive politics or impedes them.
This leads me to Galloway's second point, the claim that crits
posit that "the language of rights should be abandoned if true political
ideals are to be attained" [264 ]. Two thoughts come to mind here.
First, this seems to me to manifest what Galloway accuses the crits
of: reductionism, an absence of consideration and a failure to
discriminate. The position that rights are individualist in orientation
and therefore should be jettisoned has been extremely controversial
within the critical community, and many have argued for a re
constructive extension of the discourse of rights.82 Second, I do not
believe that crits as a collective subscribe to the idea of "true political
ideals" for they consider that the invocation of standards of truth,
with its connotations of naturalism and inevitability, has historically
operated as a form of political and philosophical closure thereby
excluding those who either do not have access to, or come within
the parameters of that "truth". Thus, most crits, I think, eschew
pretensions to truth and make their arguments on significantly more
modest grounds, they recognize the importance of openness, and
Galloway draws on Brosnan's, "Serious but Not Critical" (1987), 60 So.
Cal. LR 259, 270.
79 See for example, A. Hyde, "The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology
of Law" (1983), Wisconsin LR 379. See also Birmingham Centre for
Contemporary Cultural Studies, On Ideology (1978); C. Sumner, Reading
Ideologies (1979).
80 The ideological ramifications of our gendered nature provides a good example
of what I am trying to get at here. See, for example, M. Belenky et al.,
Women 's Ways of Knowing (1986).
8 1 Consider, for example, Michael Walzer's defence of American warmongering
in the Gulf in pursuit of its economic self interest, CBC Radio, "Sunday
Morning", 10th Feb. 199 1.
82 See for example, R.M. Unger, "The System of Rights", False Necessity ( 1 987),
508; S. Lynd, "Community Rights" ( 1 984), 62 Texas LR 1417.
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they subscribe to the virtues of contingency and self reflexivity.
This, of course, does not make their political decision-making easy
or· uncontroversial for contextualism has its price. However, it has
the virtue of not avoiding responsibility for one's choices based
upon something called "truth".
Even more interesting than these misunderstandings of critical
positions is the nature of the partial defence that Galloway raises
for liberalism. His basic position is that the critical agenda is
mistargetted because the problems it highlights exist with the
political reality of modernity, "the defects in the political order"
[265) and not with the "ideas promoted by (liberal) legal theorists"
[264]. These are, indeed, interesting propositions to put forward
and they echo his earlier claim that liberalism as an academic
tradition - as perhaps "too rich a tradition" [264] - must be
distinguished from liberalism as political practice. But there are,
in my opinion, some real problems here.
First, Galloway's claim "(t)hat the political world may overlap
with the theoretical but they do not share an identity" [264] betrays
a disturbing assumption that theory transcends politics, that theory
is somehow free floating. This fails to come to terms with the critical
conception of ideology that sees the production of theory as always
and already overdetermined by relations of power. Second, yet again,
Galloway overextends the ambitions of the critical analysis. Crits
are not such idealists to believe that legal theorists are crucial to
the legitimation strategies perpetrated by the politically and cul
turally powerful. The critical position, as I have emphasized before,
is that perpetuating the ideology of liberalism, even when they
attempt to reupholster it in the pursuit of what even some crits
might consider to be progressive ends,83 renders them complicit
in the continuance of relations of domination and subordination.
The suggestion of the crits is that if legal theorists want to pursue
the ideals of substantive equality to facilitate genuine conditions
for individual fulfilment, then the critical path is the better one
to take for it is less contaminated by - though certainly not immune
to - the politics of domination and subordination.
These concerns are further reinforced when Galloway admits,
as he must, that liberal theorists fail "often to carry their ideals
through to consider the implications of their theory for p·articular
groups within the community" such as "native groups and women"
[264 ], that is, those who are dispossessed by the past and present
practices of liberal political practice. But Galloway leaves begging
the question of why this is the case? Let me make two brief
conjectures that build on earlier parts of this essay. The first is
that I think that liberal legal theorists, particularly those within
the analytical philosophical tradition, begin and end their analyses
of freedom, liberty, equality and rights at the level of the conceptual,
never really coming to terms with the existential reality of sub83

In Raz's case, I am thinking about his seeming support for Palestinian "self
determination", Morality, 207.
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ordination.84 This is not to be taken as an argument against
conceptualism or theory, but only to re-emphasize that we are the
products of our circumstances and that what we know, and how
we even begin to get a grasp of what we know, depends upon
the specificities of our experiences. My second proposition is more
programmatic. If modern liberal democratic society is to become
more responsive to the egalitarian demands of those who have been
the victims of liberal praxis, then this will require dramatic trans
formation of our political, legal, social and economic structures;
it will require full and equal participation in all the decision-making
spheres of existence; it will require that no aspect of our relations
be rendered immune to political reconstruction. 85 However, to take
Raz as an example, his perfectionist theory is not only premised
upon a traditionally narrow conception of "the political"86 but, in
fact, is deliberately constructed so as to avoid the mobilization that
would be engendered by "a radical programme of change through
political action"·.s1
There is a further point here. Galloway also suggests that even
though liberal theorists themselves have not addressed the needs
of, for example, women or native people, liberal theory can be
extended to incorporate them [264 ]. This, I believe, is a problematic
position to take. It structurally places those who have been dis
advantaged by patriarchal and ethnocentric privilege in a position
of petitioning to be now counted as part of the extended liberal
family. 88 It does not consider that, perhaps, some of the key concepts
of liberalism (whatever they might be after the Razian renovation)
may themselves be so contingent upon or loaded with preconceptions
of privilege that they are fundamentally antithetical to the world
view of those who would be allegedly advantaged. Consider, for
example, Mary Ellen Turpel's argument that the very nature of
the discourse of rights is alien to First Nation's peoples and that
the Charter - and the monopolization of the modes of discourse
engendered by it - is another form of cultural imperialism;89 or
Carol Smart's proposition that modern law is a juridogenic social
practice.90 Galloway's deeply entrenched assumption is that liber
alism should be assumed to be at the centre of the jurisprudential
universe, and that it be given a chance to work for these outsiders.
These suspicions are intensified when we are told that Raz, for example,
"doesn't do much non-philosophical reading, except for the New York Review
of Books" . See Levine, supra note 28, 739.
85 See generally, R.M. Unger, Politics (1987) and I.M. Young, Justice and the
Politics of Difference (1990).
86 Morality, 3.
s7 id., 427.
88 For a more extended discussion of this problem see Alexandra Z. Dobro
wolsky, "Promises Unfulfilled: Women and the Theory and Practice of
Representative Democracy in Canada" (1990).
89 M.E. Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpretive
Monopolies, Cultural Differences", in Perspectives,supra note 6, 503.
9° Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (1989), 161.
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Surely, the burden should be the other way.Liberal theory because
of its acknowledged failure to deal with liberal practice should be
assumed to be unsalvageable. The responsibility would be on
liberalism to prove itself amenable. A starting point might be for
revisionists like Raz to recognize class, race and gender as something
more than non-issues.
In the end, it all boils down to an exercise in passing the buck,
for as Galloway claims, the focus of the critical legal enterprise
should be on "the defects in the political order rather than in our
philosophical traditions or theoretical ambitions" (265].The radical
- and here I am using it in relation to its Greek etymology, that
is, "going to the root of' - point is that these traditions and ambitions
cannot escape their cultural - less euphemistically, class, racial
and sexual - and historical context, they are a constitutive part
of the political order. Like Galloway's paper, liberalism as a
philosophical tradition has become part of the problem, not part
of the solution.9 1
CONCLUSION
As I stated at the beginning of this essay, I think that Galloway's
intervention is an important contribution to the jurisprudential
conversation. I certainly welcome it. However, my reasons for
appreciating it may not be those which he would expect. First,
assuming that he is correct that crits are guilty of false representation,
absence of consideration, reductionism, absence of discrimination
and an instrumental conception of liberal theory (all of which I
have denied), it should be clear that he too is guilty of some of
the same sins. Second, and more interestingly, I welcome Galloway's
essay because its value, from my perspective, lies not so much in
what it says but in what it implies.Primarily it is driven by a fear
that the crits are being too successful, that they have destabilized
the hegemony of the liberal legal academy, that they have decentred
the liberal discursive agenda. But this, I think, is an overreaction.
Critical legal studies, in an ironic sort of way, continues to reaffirm
the centrality of liberalism because so much of liberalism remains
at the core of the critical agenda. The only difference is that it
is no longer portrayed in its best light. In short, crits admit that
it is dominant ideology.Galloway's essay in retrieval, when viewed
in this light, is intriguing because it provides a classic case study
of liberal ideological fideism, that in spite of itself acknowledges
the poverty of liberal legalism, confirming rather than denying the
accuracy of the critical position.
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There are several other sub-allegations that Galloway makes against the
crits. I have dealt with what I consider to be the more important ones,
and I do not wish to burden the reader with a reply to every complaint.

